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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction concerning Patrick Tilt (hereinafter
"Appellant") for Murder, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203.
(Rec. at 248; Add. I). Appellant plead not guilty to the only charge in the information,
proceeded to a jury trial, and was ultimately convicted of Count I: Murder.

This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal of a criminal case involving a first
degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2.
All of the issues raised herein were appropriately preserved in Appellant's Motions
to Suppress Evidence and through timely objections raised during the course of trial.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ADMITTING A STATEMENT
MADE BY APPELLANT, WHERE APPELLANT WAS A SUSPECT
WHEN
THE
STATEMENT
WAS M A D E ,
NO
CONTEMPORANEOUS OR VERBATIM RECORD OF THE
STATEMENT WAS CREATED, AND WHERE RECORDING WAS
FEASIBLE?

Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, Utah appellate
courts review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999).
This issue was preserved through Appellant's Motion to Suppress Evidence filed on
August 4, 2003. (Rec. at 60; Add. V). Appellant's motion was denied after extensive
argument also on August 4, 2003. (Tr. Vol. I at 113; Rec. at 231-234).
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2.

DID COUNSEL FOR THE STATE IMPROPERLY AND
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO
THE DEFENSE BY IMPLYING DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT
THAT IT WAS UP TO THE DEFENSE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE
DEATH WAS ACCIDENTAL?

The issue as to whether a court wrongly denied a motion for mistrial based on
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Pritchett, 69 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Utah 2003). This standard is met where "the error is
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there
would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." Id.; quoting State v. Harmon,
956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998).
This issue was preserved through Appellant's timely objection and motion for mistrial.
(Tr. Vol. IV at 82, 85).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are referred to in
Appellants' Brief and are reproduced at Addendum IV: Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution; Article I Section 7 and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution; Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 and § 78-2-2; and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
An Information filed on or about July 31,2002, charged Appellant with Murder, a first

degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-5-203. (Rec. at 1-2; Add. I).

B.

Course of Proceedings
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the statement at issue on August 4,2003. (Rec.

at 60, Add. V). The court heard argument on the matter and denied the motion on August
4,2003. The court issued a written order to that effect on September 10,2003. (Rec. at 231 234; Add. VI).

C.

Disposition in Trial Court
A jury trial was held in the instant case on August 4, 2003 through August 8, 2003.

Appellant was ultimately convicted of Murder, a first degree felony. Sentencing was set for
September 16, 2003. (Rec. at 248-49; Add. I). On that date, Appellant was sentenced to
serve an indeterminate term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison. Id. Appellant filed
a timely notice of appeal on September 16, 2003. (Rec. at 251).
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D.

Statement of Material Facts
The Appellant, Patrick Tilt, was born on November 28,1981. (R. at 1). Throughout

his childhood and into adulthood, Appellant encountered certain developmental issues. More
specifically, he matured at a significantly slower rate than did his peers. Throughout his
schooling, this caused Appellant to experience difficulties academically. (Tr. Vol III at 91).
He was consequently tested to determine whether he was developing normally. After testing,
it was determined that Appellant required remedial classes to address these developmental
difficulties. Id.
These developmental delays continued as Appellant became an adult. Consequently,
Appellant, even in 2002, was unable to understanding many things as an adult would. For
instance, Appellant could not understand why his child had to be delivered early and why he
would not be healthy. Appellant's mother tried to explain these things to him but he was
unable to comprehend the situation due to his deficient "mentality." (Tr. Vol. Ill at 97).
Several witnesses noted these distinct developmental issues and testified that Appellant was
unable to function as an adult. (See e.g. Tr. Vol II at 59; Tr. Vol. Ill at 94-95, 155).
Witnesses also testified that Appellant was functioning, intellectually and emotionally on the
level of a junior high or highschool student. (Tr. Vol. II at 59; Tr. Vol III at 95).
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Appellant met Melissa Evangelista on August 6,2001. The two began dating shortly
thereafter. (Tr. Vol II at 30). Ms. Evangelista discovered that she was pregnant with
Appellant's child on October 1, 2001. Appellant and Ms. Evangelista were married on
November 3, 2001. (Tr. Vol. II at 31). Complications were encountered early in the
pregnancy. As a result, Ms. Evangelista was admitted to hospital on February 6, 2002, only
part way through the pregnancy's second trimester. Ms. Evangelista stayed at the hospital
until the baby was born approximately four weeks later. (Tr. Vol. II at 36).
Since the child was categorized as an "extreme premature infant," having been born
after only twenty-four weeks gestation, he spent several weeks in intensive care immediately
following the birth. (Tr. Vol. II at 133-34). The child was eventually released from the
hospital in June, 2002. Thereafter, Dr. Catherine Stokes of the McKay-Dee hospital treated
his medical issues. Even after being released from hospital, the child continued to experience
medical difficulties. An important part of his continuing treatment was to compensate for
the poor development of his lungs and digestive system. Most notably, the child needed to
be connected to an oxygen machine and monitoring system to compensate for his
underdeveloped lungs. (Tr. Vol II at 134-35). It appeared as though the child's condition
was improving and Dr. Stokes had begun lowering the levels of oxygen administered. (See
Tr. Vol. II at 146-47).
-6-

In the course of Dr. Stokes' treatment, a chest X-ray was ordered on June 25, 2002.
Dr. Stokes noted nothing unusual as to this X-ray. On July 22, 2002, the child was brought
to Dr. Stokes because the family believed that his arm had been injured. An X-ray was taken
and it showed that there may have been a small fracture to the arm but the results were
inconclusive. (Tr. Vol. II at 148-49). On July 22, 2002, Dr. Stokes conducted a physical
exam of the child, which revealed no evidence of injury to the ribs. However, generally, such
injuries would not become apparent during a physical examination. Dr. Stokes also testified
that it would take a great deal of force to break a baby's ribs. (Tr. Vol. II at 179).
During this time, Appellant, Melissa Evangelista, and her mother, Mary, shared a
residence.1 Melissa and Mary Evangelista were the child's primary care givers during the
day because Appellant was working at Deseret Industries. Appellant would take a more
active role in the child's care at night.

(Tr. Vol. II at 46).

On July 23, 2002, the child appeared to be doing well given his various continuing
ailments. However, the baby was fussy. (Tr. Vol. II at 43-44, 76). Appellant and Ms.
Evangelista took the child to a family member's home to hear his band practice. After that,
the family went to a Ms. Val Alder's house to visit. Once the family arrived home,

Evidence was presented indicating that Appellant lived with Ms. Evangelista and her mother
intermittently in the months following the child's birth. However, there is no dispute that Appellant
shared the residence when the incident occurred.
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Appellant, Melissa Evangelista and Mary Evangelista all helped get the child ready for bed.
(Tr. Vol. II at 74,77). At approximately 11:00 p.m. everyone in the household went to sleep.
(Tr. Vol. II at 76). Melissa Evangelista woke up at 3:00 a.m. because the baby was fussing.
She fed and changed the baby and then went back to sleep. When she awoke the next
morning, she heard Appellant notably distressed because something was wrong with the
baby. (Tr. Vol. II at 48). The child was lying on the bed and was not breathing. Mary
Evangelista attempted to administer C.P.R., as did paramedics, but the child was deceased.
Dr. Maureen Frikke of the medical examiner's office conducted a post mortem
examination of the deceased. (Tr. Vol. II at 193). She noted that several of the deceased's
ribs were broken and some of the ribs had been broken more than once. She ultimately
concluded that the child had died of asphyxiation due to chest compression. (Tr. Vol. II at
222). Dr. Frikke further testified that a baby's rib could break "without a whole lot of force"
but that the force required would be more than that associated with "cuddling." (Tr. Vol II
at 213, 216). Furthermore, if someone had exerted force on the child's chest, that person
would not have any indication that ribs were breaking and would not necessarily know
whether the force applied would prevent breathing. (Tr. Vol. II at 243, 250).
Meanwhile, Detective Gent (hereinafter "Gent") ofthe Ogden City Police Department
was arranging to interview the family members concerning the death. On July 30, 2002,
-8-

Gent interrogated Appellant from 9:30 a.m. till approximately 12:00 noon. (Tr. Vol. Ill at
7, 50-52). This statement was not recorded notwithstanding ready access to recording
equipment.

(Tr. Vol. Ill at 63). At the beginning of the interview, Gent testified that

Appellant was not a suspect. However, midway through the interrogation, he determined that
Appellant was a suspect and believed that Appellant was close to giving a confession. (Tr.
Vol. Ill at 50, 63). Although Appellant was a suspect and Gent believed he would confess,
no recording equipment was utilized.
Detective Gent stated that he would type a question into his computer as he asked it
and then would type Appellant's response "word for word." (Tr. Vol. Ill at 24). However,
the typed statement did not depict the interaction between Appellant and Gent "word for
word." For instance, Gent conceded that he likely told Appellant to stop or slow down at
places because he could not type quickly. (Tr. Vol. Ill at 43-44). More importantly though,
Gent stated that there were parts of the interview that he did not record at all. At one point
Appellant began asking questions and Gent did not type the questions or his answers thereto.
(Tr. Vol. Ill at 63). During this interrogation, Appellant made various inculpatory statements
constituting admissions and, arguably, a confession. Appellant moved the court to suppress
this statement but this motion was denied before trial.
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Appellant was eventually charged and convicted of one count of murder related to the
death of his son.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah courts have long urged law enforcement officials to utilize recording equipment
when interrogating suspects. There are many policy implications indicating that such is an
efficient and effective use of resources. A verbatim record protects the officer from false
allegations of coercion, aids the judicial determination of such claims, and serves to protect
a defendant's constitutional rights. Nonetheless in 1995, the Utah Supreme Court declined
to adopt a rule that would only allow into evidence confessions presented through a
contemporaneous verbatim record. The court reasoned that to adopt such a rule would
inappropriately exclude many statements made in unexpected places or at unexpected times
when recording equipment was not available.
Appellant urges this court to adopt a substantially narrower rule, under the due process
clause of the Utah Constitution, as enunciated by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Under that
rule, confessions are only suppressed if the statement is elicited at a place of detention and
recording is feasible. Under this rule, the fears expressed by the Utah Supreme Court would
be unfounded while the policy considerations in favor of recording would be addressed.
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In the instant case, Appellant was interrogated at the Ogden City Police Department,
a place of detention. Moreover, Detective Gent testified that he had ready access to both
audio and video recording devices. Therefore, recording was feasible. Under these
circumstances, Defendant's statement should be suppressed.
In relation to Appellant's second assertion of error, the prosecution, in closing
argument, inappropriately implied that Appellant should have presented some evidence that
the death occurred accidentally. This impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant. Moreover, since, according to the State's theory of the case, Appellant was the
only person competent to testify as to how the death occurred, the prosecution's statement
unconstitutionally spoke to his decision not to testify. Such references are invariably
unconstitutional such that Appellant's timely motion for mistrial should have been granted.

ARGUMENT
I.

REVERSAL IS WARRANTED WHERE APPELLANT'S
STATEMENT WAS NOT RECORDED NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT IT WAS TAKEN IN A PLACE OF DETENTION
WHERE VERBATIM RECORDING WAS FEASIBLE.

Courts have long recognized the great sway that a confession may hold over a jury.
Conversely, courts have also noted the high degree of unreliability that accompanies many
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confessions. Consequently, the criminal justice system has developed certain rules that apply
solely to the issue of a confession's admissibility. Appellant asks this Court to extend this
line ofjurisprudence by recognizing a rule whereby an interrogation conducted at a place of
detention must be recorded where recording is feasible. Such is a requirement of due process
under the Utah Constitution.

A.

An analysis of pertinent policy considerations supports a rule whereby
confessions must be recorded.

"It is beyond dispute that some people falsely confess to committing a crime that was
never committed or was committed by someone else." State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah
2003); citing The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L &
Criminology 429, 432-33 & n. 10 (1998); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision
to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 979, 983
(1997). Moreover, "the experience of the courts, the police and the medical profession
recounts a number of false confessions voluntarily made." Smith v. United States, 348 U.S.
147, 153 (1954). "The doubt persists t h a t . . . the aberration or weakness of the accused
under the strain of suspicion may tinge or warp the facts of a confession." Opper v. United
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States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1954); Mauchley, 61 P.3d at 483. This demonstrated inherent
unreliability that accompanies a confession is but one important policy consideration as to
why this Court should adopt a rule whereby an unrecorded confession should be suppressed
if it was elicited in a place of detention where recording is feasible.
Courts in Utah and elsewhere have long recognized that "no other class of evidence
is as potentially prejudicial to defendants as confessions." Mauchley, 67 P.3d at 489-90;
quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 271, 293 (1975). "If an officer's memory of a confession is distorted,
inaccurate, or incomplete, whether because of the lapse in time or a variety of psychological
factors, the defendant may be forced into the dilemma of having to waive his right not to
testify or allowing an erroneous account of the confession to go to the jury." State v.
Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 426-27 (Utah 1995). Moreover, in such circumstances, "[t]he
importance of... a tape recording lies in the fact that trial courts and appellate courts tend
to trust police officers' recollections of what occurred at the expense of the criminal
defendant's account. Thus, in the absence of a tape recording, the prosecuting authorities
invariably win the swearing contest." Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397,414 (Alaska App. 1984)
(Singleton J., concurring and dissenting). Therefore, where an unrecorded statement is
admitted into evidence, the recognized prejudicial effect of a confession is compounded. A
-13-

rule requiring the recording of custodial interrogations would serve to protect a defendant's
rights and constitute a step forward in the search for truth. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456
F.2d 503, 506-07 (8th Cir. 1972).
However, protecting a defendant's constitutional rights is but one policy consideration
supporting a rule requiring a verbatim record of interrogations. In many cases, disputes arise
as to whether a defendant was properly read his Miranda rights. A recording of an
interrogation would greatly serve the interests of justice and judicial economy by allowing
the reviewing court to examine the process exactly as it happened.

Similarly, many

confessions are challenged on the basis that they were made involuntarily. A verbatim record
would greatly aid a reviewing court in determining whether such statements were coerced.
SeeStephanv. State, 111 P.2d 1156,1157 (Alaska 1985). A rule requiring a verbatim record
of confessions not only protects defendants, it protects officers against false claims of
coercion and serves the interests of justice and judicial economy. Therefore, the mandates
of due process under Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution should be read to include
such a requirement whereby confessions elicited at a place of detention must be recorded to
be admissible at trial.
Compared against the foregoing important policy considerations in favor of adopting
such a rule, the policies against such a rule are minimal. Today, recording devices are
-14-

inexpensive and are widely available. For instance, in this case, Detective Gent had ready
access to both tape recorders and video equipment. Furthermore, Gent testified that the
statement was not recorded because recording might have had a chilling effect on
Appellant's willingness to talk. (Tr. Vol. Ill at 63). However, other courts have expressly
rejected this assertion and have held that it alone will not excuse a failure to record. "The
only real reason advanced by police for their frequent failure to electronically record an entire
interrogation is their claim that recordings tend to have a 'chilling effect' on a suspect's
willingness to talk. Given the fact that an accused has a constitutional right to remain silent,
under both state and federal constitutions, and that he must be clearly warned of that right
prior to any custodial interrogation, this argument is not persuasive." Stephan, 711 P.2d at
1161. Therefore, an analysis of all pertinent policy considerations supports a rule requiring
the recording of confessions.

B.

While the Federal Constitution does not require the verbatim recording
of confessions, this Court may establish such a rule under Article I
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

The State will no doubt argue that the United States Constitution does not require the
verbatim recording of confessions to determine their admissibility. Such an assertion is
likely correct under California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). Under Trombetta, the
-15-

violation at issue here may not cross the threshold of constitutional materiality. Id.; See also
Stephan, 111 P.2d at 1160-61.
However, as the Utah Supreme Court has duly noted in a similar situation, the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution are identical. Nonetheless, courts should "not hesitate to give the Utah
Constitution a different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the
rights of this state's citizens." State v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000). Therefore,
while a rule requiring recording may not be established under the federal constitution, such
a rule may be adopted pursuant to the Constitution of Utah.

C.

The precise issue at bar has not yet been addressed by Utah courts such
that the issue is not resolved by Utah precedent.

The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar but legally distinct argument in State v.
Villarreal 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). There, the defendant apparently argued that all
confessions must be suppressed unless a contemporaneous verbatim record is produced. The
Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
Notwithstanding the desirability of recording confessions, it is neither
practicable nor possible to require contemporaneous recordings in all
instances. When a formal confession is given in a police station, it could, and
should, be recorded. But confessions, and admissions short of a confession,
-16-

can be made anywhere at unexpected times and places where formal recording
is impossible. Barring all such evidence would deprive the courts of much
evidence that is generally reliable. Thus we hold that contemporaneous
recording of a confession is not mandated by the Utah Constitution.
Id. at 426. Therefore, in Villarreal, the court was asked to adopt a rule whereby a confession
could only be admitted into evidence by way of a contemporaneous verbatim recording. No
consideration was given to the feasibility of recording or the availability of recording
equipment. The court declined to adopt such a broad, blanket rule because confessions made
in circumstances where recording was infeasible would also be suppressed. The rule
proposed here is significantly narrower in scope such that the fears expressed in Villarreal
should be allayed.
Appellant urges this Court to adopt the narrow rule enunciated by the Alaska Supreme
Court in Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). There, the court phrased its narrow
rule as follows, "the rule that we adopt today requires that custodial interrogations in a place
of detention, including the giving of the accused's Miranda rights, must be electronically
recorded." Therefore, the rule proposed here would only apply to interrogations in places
of detention. It would not apply to confessions elicited "at unexpected times and places
where formal recording is impossible." See Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 426. Moreover, the
Alaska Supreme Court was careful to qualify the rule so that it only applied in instances
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where recording was feasible.

It left open the possibility of admitting unrecorded

confessions where recording was infeasible. Stefan, 711 P.2d at 1162. Therefore, under the
rule adopted in Stefan, and the rule proposed in the instant case, there would be no danger
that confessions would be suppressed merely because their recording was infeasible. Where
the court's reasoning in Villerreal does not apply to the precise issue at bar, its precedential
value is limited.
Moreover, and in the alternative, even if this Court finds that Villereal is directly on
point, changing conditions mandate a departure from the prior holding. As the Utah Supreme
Court recently explained, a court is not bound by the rule of stare decisis where it is " 'clearly
convinced that [a] rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing
conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent,'" In such
instances, courts are " 'not inexorably bound by [the court's] own precedents.'" Mauchley,
67 P.3d at 481; quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994); quoting John
Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill. L.Rev. 367, 367 (1957).
Changing conditions since 1995 have put this Court in roughly the same position that
the Alaska Supreme Court was in in 1985 when Stephan was decided. The Alaska Supreme
Court was hesitant to adopt a rule of exclusion and avoided doing so for many years. Instead,
it issued non-binding instructions that officers should record confessions where feasible. See
-18-

e.g. Mallottv. State, 608 P.2d737 (Alaska 1980); S.B. v. State, 614 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1980).
Notwithstanding the instruction in dicta, officers continued to fail to record confessions, even
during custodial interrogation. Officers generally cited the chilling effect arguably associated
with recording. In response, the Alaska Supreme Court declared a rule of exclusion where
its own precedent had declined to do so.
Similarly, Utah courts have repeatedly given instruction, through dicta, indicating that
officers should record confessions when it is possible to do so. See Villarreal, 889 P.2d at
426; State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989); State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1018
(Utah App. 1993). Yet in the instant case, as was the case in Stephan, the officer failed to
record the confession and merely cited the chilling effect recording might have had as his
reason for doing do. (Tr. Vol. Ill at 63). Where the court's prior suggestions have failed to
affect officer conduct, a remedy is required: in the instant case, involving the violation of
constitutional rights, exclusion of evidence is the appropriate remedy. Stephan, 111 P.2d at
1162. Therefore, even if this Court finds that the issue presented herein was decided in
Villarreal in 1995, changing conditions, namely continued noncompliance, indicates that a
different holding is required some nine years later.
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D.

Applying the foregoing rule to the instant case, Appellants statement
should have been suppressed.

Again, so as to avoid any confusion, the rule proposed here is substantially narrower
than the rule proposed in VillarreaL Appellant does not contend, as did the defendant in
Villarreal, that only recorded confessions are admissible. Rather, consistent with the holding
in Stefan, suppression is only appropriate as to unrecorded confessions made during
interrogation at a place of detention where recording is feasible. Applying this narrow rule
to the facts of the instant case indicates that Appellant's motion to suppress was improperly
denied.
In the instant case, the questioning began as a witness interview. Detective Gent had
not characterized Appellant as a suspect when the interrogation began. (Tr. Vol. Ill at 50).
However, at some point during the three hour interview, the interaction changed from a
witness interview to the interrogation of a suspect. Id. Any statements elicited after the
interaction became a suspect interrogation should be suppressed.
Furthermore, the interrogation took place at the Ogden City Police Department, which
is a place of detention. Finally, Detective Gent himself testified that he had ready access to
both sound and video recording devices. (See Tr. Vol III at 63). Therefore, recording was
feasible. He also testified that the only reason that he did not obtain a recording device was
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to avoid any chilling effect that recording may have had on the interrogation. As previously
explained, such considerations do not make recording infeasible. Therefore, where Appellant
was interrogated in a place of detention, and where recording was feasible, his unrecorded
statement should have been suppressed.

II.

A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED WHERE THE PROSECUTOR'S
COMMENTS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT IMPROPERLY
SHIFTED THE BURDEN TO THE DEFENSE TO PROVE THAT
THE DEATH OCCURRED ACCIDENTALLY.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 governs motions for new trial. The rule reads in
pertinent part as follows: "The court may... grant a new trial in the interest ofjustice if there
is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."
Utah R. Crim. P. 24. Utah courts have repeatedly recognized that prosecutorial misconduct
during trial proceedings may serve as a ground for ordering a new trial. See e.g. State v.
Saunders, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999); State v. Callahan, 55 P.3d 573 (Utah 2002). A
prosecutor's remarks will be deemed improper and will constitute prosecutorial misconduct
if the remarks "called to the juror's attention matters which they would not be justified in
considering in reaching a verdict." State v. Ernrnett, 839 P.2d 781,785 (Utah 1992); quoting
State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983). Improper remarks must be deemed harmful
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if the resulting error " 'is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood
that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result.'" State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d
7 (Utah 2000); quoting State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct.App.1998); but see
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) (in case seeking new trial based on prosecutorial
misconduct, "[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court
may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."). State v. Callahan, 55 P.3d 573, 593 (Utah 2002).
Moreover, the foregoing principles are even more pronounced in cases where a
defendant asserts his right not to testify in his defense. In such cases, a prosecutor's direct
reference to a defendant's decision not to testify is a per se violation of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. However, even "indirect references to a
defendant's failure to testify are constitutionally impermissible if the comments were
manifestly intended to be or were of such a character that the jury would naturally and
necessarily construe them to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify." State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987).
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A.

The prosecution's assertion during closing argument impermissibly
implied that Defendant had a burden to present evidence and,
therefore, constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

Again, statements constitute prosecutorial misconduct if they "called to the juror's
attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict."
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). In the instant case, the prosecutor argued
that the jury should not only consider but infer guilt from the fact that Defendant did not
introduce evidence that the death occurred accidentally. (Tr. Vol. IV at 15-16)? By arguing
that the jury should infer guilt from the fact that the defendant did not provide a
"justification" or "explanation" or otherwise prove that an accident occurred, the State
inappropriately and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. The jury was
effectively told that the Defendant (1) should have introduced evidence that the death
occurred accidentally and (2) that guilt may be inferred from his failure to do so. However,
Utah law places no burden on the defendant to present any evidence in his defense. State v.
Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984). The burden in this regard never leaves the State;

2

More specifically counsel argued as follows:
In addition, most of what the defense had to say about him in terms of him
being a father tells you [that he acted intentionally]. Because it's not that it
was an accident. There was no justification as to how this was an accident.
. . There was no explanation as to how this was an accident.
(Tr. Vol IV at 75-76).
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even if a defendant decides to present no evidence, or even no case at all, the jury may not
infer guilt from such a decision. Any inference of guilt shifts the burden to the defense to
present evidence to avoid this unconstitutional inference. The Utah Supreme Court has
indicated that, in Utah, the burden should never shift from the State. See id. Therefore, the
shifting burden caused by the State's misplaced argument was constitutionally impermissible.
Moreover, under Tillman, the State's argument was "of such a character that the jury
would naturally and necessarily construe [it] to be a comment on the defendant's failure to
testify." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). There was only one person, under the
State's theory of the case, who could provide testimony as to how the death could have
occurred accidentally: Patrick Tilt. Appellant was the only person who could testify because
there were no other witnesses to the incident. Therefore, the prosecution's argument that no
evidence of accident was presented implicitly commented on Appellant's failure to testify.
Such is constitutionally impermissible.
A similar situation was addressed in State v. Fiallo-Lopez, 899 P.2d 1294 (Wash. App.
1995). There, the prosecution argued in closing that there was no evidence presented as to
why the defendant was associating with his alleged co-conspirators. The court ultimately
held that "[djespite the prosecutors passing reference to the fact that the defense had no
burden to explain Fiallo-Lopez1 actions, the State!s argument highlighted the defendant's
-24-

silence. In this case, no one other than Fiallo-Lopez himself could have offered the
explanation the State demanded. Because the argument improperly commented on the
defendant's constitutional right not to testify and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
to the defendant, it was misconduct." Id? As was the case in Fiallo-Lopez, only the
Appellant could have given the explanation demanded by the State. Therefore, the State's
argument that Appellant should have presented evidence of accidental death
unconstitutionally spoke to his decision not to testify.

B.

The prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case was not harmless;
therefore, a new trial is warranted.

Any comment as to a defendant's decision not to testify mandates reversal. However,
if this court determines that the misconduct fell short of commenting on Appellant's decision,
reversal is still appropriate where the misconduct was harmful. Prosecutorial misconduct is
harmful, and a new trial is warranted, if the resulting error " 'is substantial and prejudicial
such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more
favorable result.' " State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7 (Utah 2000); quoting State v. Longshaw, 961
P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct.App.1998). However, in this analysis, f'[i]f the conclusion of the
3

The court ultimately ruled that the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and, therefore, affirmed the conviction. Id. at 1301
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jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible to differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through
remarks of counsel." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,486 (Utah 1984). In this case, the jury was
made to balance conflicting evidence, such that this Court should scrutinize the prosecutor's
statement very closely and a new trial is required.
In the instant case, the jury was presented with a statement arguably indicating that
the death was intentionally caused. However, the jury had to weigh against this evidence
testimony as to Appellant's immature nature and the way in which he failed to understand
the cause and effect relationship his actions may have. Furthermore, there was conflicting
testimony as to the amount of force required to break a baby's ribs. Dr. Stokes testified that
it would take a great deal of force where Dr. Frikke testified that the ribs could have been
broken "without a whole lot of force." (Tr. Vol. II at 180, 213). There was, therefore,
conflicting evidence in the instant case.
When this court looks at the evidence presented at trial as a whole, the State's case
had several distinct weaknesses. This is arguably the kind of case that the Utah Supreme
Court envisioned when it explained that, where a conviction is based on "less compelling
proof, [courts] will more closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct." State v. Callihan, 55
P.3d 573 (Utah,2002). "If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting
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evidence or evidence susceptible to differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that
they will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel.11 State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,
486 (Utah 1984). In this case, there was conflicting evidence such that there was a
reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict was influenced by the prosecutorial misconduct
at issue. Therefore, the error was harmful and a new trial should be ordered as a result.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his
conviction under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March, 2004.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

By
RONALD J. YENGICH
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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day of March, 2004, to:

ADDENDUM I

MARK R. DECARIA, NO. 0850
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY
WILLIAM F. DAINES, 0805
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., STE 230
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-399-8377
Fax: 801-399-8304
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
INFORMATION

STATE OF UTAH,

CASENO.

Plaintiff,

judge

vs.

OZ\°iO??^

e>MP

OTN#:UTl 4493472

PATRICK TILT,
DOB: 11/28/1981
Defendant.
'

mi

_ . .

_

The undersigned WILLIAM F. DAINES, DEPUTY COUNTY ATfORNEY, under oath states on
information and belief that tlie defendant, in Weber County, State of Utah, committed the following
crmie(s):
COUNT 1: MURDER, afirstdegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203, as follows: That
PATRICK TILT on or about 07/24/2002, (a) intentionally Or knowingly caused the death of Andrew
Tilt;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury 10 another committed an act clearly dangerous to human life
that caused the death of Andrew Tilt;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life engaged in conduct
which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of Andrew Tilt.
This information is based on evidence obtainedfromdie following witness(es):
J. GENT, OPD
H. SECRIST, OPD
M.FRTKKE,MD.
DATED this j > l

day of July, 2QG2.
Authorized foj

By

tment and filing:

<d£$LJ

WILLIAM F. DAINES
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

005

Subscribed in my presence this

day of July, 2002.

Magistrate
Presented and filed this O K day of July, 2002.

Clerk
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ADDENDUM II
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>
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

'6

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021903447 FS

PATRICK TILT,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

?

003

SCOTT M HADLEY
September 16, 2003

PRESENT
Clerk:
marykd
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE
Prosecutor: CAMILLE L. NEIDER
L. DEAN SAUNDERS
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RONALD J. YENGICH
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 28, 1981
Video
CHARGES
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/2003 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Dorta

1

r\

M

rs

Case No: 021903447
Date:
Sep 16, 2003

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends that the defendant obtain a psychological
evaluation upon arrival at the prison and be reviewed for placement
in the Utah State Prison Mental Health Unit.
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $881.64 to
Melissa Tilt and any additional restitution for mental health
counseling.

Dated this /&

day of y<Z&c/*

, 2 0 ^J .

SCOTT M H A D L E Y '
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM III

SECOND 01S7RICJ COURT

ifiBSEP lb A <*5!
RONALD J. YENGICH (#3580)
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 021903447

vs.

„^J
S i?

PATRICK TILT,
Judge Scott M. Hadley
Defendant/Appellant.

Notice is hereby given that Patrick Tilt, Defendant/Appellant in this matter,
hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the judgment and conviction
entered against him on the 8 * day of August, 2003, and from the sentence imposed by the
Honorable Scott M. Hadley on the 16th day of September, 2003.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ffc day of September, 2003.

RONALD J. YENGICI
Attorney for Defendant/\pp^[lAit
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal, postage prepaid, this I I

day of September, 2003, to the following:

Dean Saunders
Deputy Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd. Ste 230
Ogden, UT 84401
Court Reporter of the
Second Judicial District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210
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anend. II

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

ie freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
eaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
>dress of grievances
AMENDMENT II
Right t o b e a r a r m s . ]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
'ee State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
ot be infringed
AMENDMENT III
Q u a r t e r i n g soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without t h e consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
lanner to be prescribed by law
AMENDMENT IV
U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s a n d seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
tapers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seiures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
ipon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
>articularly describing the place to be searched, and the
>ersons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due proiess of l a w a n d j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
nfamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
j r a n d Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
>r in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
)ffence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
lor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
)f law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
A M E N D M E N T VI
[ R i g h t s of a c c u s e d . ]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial b y j u r y in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversyshall exceed twenty dollars, the nght of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
A M E N D M E N T VIII
[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted

A M E N D M E N T DC
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, t
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by"!
people.
AMENDMENT X
[ P o w e r s r e s e r v e d to s t a t e s o r people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved!
the States respectively, or to the people.
A M E N D M E N T XI
[ S u i t s a g a i n s t s t a t e s — R e s t r i c t i o n of j u d i c i a l powe
The judicial power of the United States shall not be ^
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commeno
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citize
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign i
A M E N D M E N T XII
[ E l e c t i o n of P r e s i d e n t a n d Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, J
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state^j
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person $
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted i s !
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of a B |
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted i
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, wM#
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to t h e j
the Government of the United States, directed to the 3
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate sh
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives*
the certificates and the votes shall then be count*
person having the greatest number of votes for
'.
shall be the President, if such number be a m a j o r i t y
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no
such majority, then from the persons having thejj
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those i
President, the House of Representatives shall chooseij
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the V
the votes shall be taken by states, the represent
each state having one vote; a quorum for this pu
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of tjJ
and a majority of ail the states shall be necessary tfj
And if the House of Representatives shall not*
President whenever the right of choice shall
them, before the fourth day of March next following*]
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the j
death or other constitutional disability of the 1
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-I
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majff
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no 1
majority, then from the two highest numbers on \
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quor
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the w a 0 * ^ j
Senators, and a majority of the whole nu:
necessary to a choice. But no person constitution
to the office of President shall be eligible to
President of the United States.
A M E N D M E N T XIII
Section
1. (Slavery prohibited.)
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Utah uoae section /\nicie 1, oauuii /
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
No History for Constitution
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 CO_02008.ZIP 1,567 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title) All Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Monday, January 13, 2003
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Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
No History for Constitution
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 CO_02015.ZIP 1,765 Bytes
Sections in this ChapteijChapters in this Title|All TitleslLegislative Home Page
Last revised: Monday, January 13, 2003
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U.C.A. 1953 § 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 3
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
PART 2. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
7 6 - 5 - 2 0 3 Murder.

(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 years of
age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-404.1;
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
(I) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(P) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
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(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the actor
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death
of another;
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the
predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the
commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted
commission of any predicate offense; and
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or attempted
commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if
the actor uses force against a peace officer;
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant
to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 765-205.5.
(3) Murder is a first degree felony.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or
excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include:
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the reasonable
belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.

U T ST s 76-5-203

History: C. 1953, 76-5-203, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-203; 1975, ch. 53, § 2; 1977, ch.
83, § 2; 1979, ch. 74, § 1; 1986, ch. 157, § 1; 1990, ch. 227, § 1; 1991, ch. 10, § 9; 1996, ch. 123,
§ 1; 1999, ch. 2, § 2; 1999, ch. 90, § 2; 2000, ch. 101, § 1; 2000, ch. 125, § 3; 2003, ch. 146, § 1.
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-203, UT ST § 76-5-203
Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003
(Federal Cases).
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
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c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I. Courts
CHAPTER 2. SUPREME COURT
78-2-2 Supreme Court jurisdiction.

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States.

(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.

(3) The Supreme Court has
interlocutory appeals, over:

appellate

jurisdiction,

including

jurisdiction

of

(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;

(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;

the Court

of Appeals prior

to

(c) discipline of lawyers;

(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;

(e) final
with:

orders

and

decrees

in

formal

adjudicative

proceedings

(i) the Public Service Commission;

(ii) the State Tax Commission;

(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;

(v) the state engineer; or

(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;

(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);

of

informal

(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the
United
States or this
state unconstitutional
on its
face under
the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;

(h) interlocutory appeals from any court
first degree or capital felony;

(i) appeals from the district court
first degree felony or capital felony;

of

record involving

involving

a conviction

a charge of a

or

charge

of a

(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and

(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on
legislative subpoenas.

(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters ever
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:

(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;

(b) election and voting contests;

(c) reapportionment of election districts;

(d) retention or removal of public officers;

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and

(f) those matters described in Subsections

(3)(a) through (d).

(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for
writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).

(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

4 6b,

History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 47, § 4 1 ; 1987, ch. 161, § 303;
1988, ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127, § 1 1 ; 1994, ch. 191, § 2;
1995, ch. 267, § 5; 1995, ch. 299, § 46; 1996, ch. 159, § 1 8 ; 2001, ch. 302, § 1.

U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2-2, UT ST § 78-2-2

Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003
(Federal C a s e s ) .

Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

of the LexisNexis Group.

All rights reserved.
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
in an illegal manner, at any time.
fcon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the
W shall impose sentence in accordance with Title 77,
. i6a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over
jntally ill offender committed to the Department of Huirices as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16ab) the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.
fig. Arrest of judgment.
Pgay time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court
1 its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant
f arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not
lltitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or
. is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon
judgment the court may, unless a judgment of
fettal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has
ed, order a commitment until the defendant is charged
ror retried, or may enter any other order as may be just
| ©roper under the circumstances.
j 24. Motion for new trial.
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own
ative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is
jjf error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse
; upon the rights of a party.
|jb) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and
t notice. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or
nee of the essential facts in support of the motion. If
Ktional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence
he court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such
! as it deems reasonable.
J{c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days
r imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the
JiuErt may fix during the ten-day period.
*/(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same
rition as if no trial had been held and the former verdict
not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in
fargument.

Rule 27

orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending
the filing of new charges as the interest of justice may require.
Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in
bringing the defendant to trial or based upon the statute of
limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the
offense charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor,
the court may dismiss the case if it is compromised by the
defendant and the injured party. The injured party shall first
acknowledge the compromise before the court or in writing.
The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and
entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense; provided however, that
dismissal by compromise shall not be granted when the
misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in
the performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to
commit a felony.
Rule 26. Repealed.
Rule 27. Stays p e n d i n g appeal.

(a)(1) A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal or a
petition for other relief is pending.
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be
stayed if an appeal is taken and a certificate of probable cause
is issued.
(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order
of judgment in favor of the defendant may be granted by the
court upon good cause pending disposition of the appeal.
(b) A person who has been found guilty of an offense and
Sentenced to a term of incarceration in jail or prison, and who
has filed a notice of appeal, shall be detained, unless the trial
Judge issues a certificate of probable cause and determines by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely
to flee during pendency of the appeal and that the defendant
will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community if released under any of the conditions set forth in
paragraph (g).
(c) If the trial court denies the defendant a certificate of
probable cause, or finds that the defendant is likely to flee or
ile 25. Dismissal w i t h o u t trial.
poses a danger to the safety of any other person or the
6- (a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in further- community and denies release, the decision may be appealed
lance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or
to the court in which the notice of appeal of the conviction has
|ttpon application of either party, order an information or
been filed.
^indictment dismissed.
(d)(1) No certificate of probable cause shall issue except
| (b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment upon application of the defendant filed with the appropriate
kwhen:
Court.
?-> (1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in
(2) The application for a certificate of probable cause shall
; bringing defendant to trial;
be in writing and accompanied by a memorandum of law
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, toidentifying the issues to be presented on appeal and support;gether with any bill of particulars furnished in support
ing the defendant's position that those issues raise a substan* thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in tial question of law or fact reasonably likely to result in
iae pleading so filed;
reversal, an order for a new trial or a sentence that does not
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial
include a term of incarceration in jail or prison.
defect in the impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the
(3) If release is denied, any appeal shall be accompanied by
grand jury;
cm affidavit made and signed by counsel for the defendant, or
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
by the defendant if the defendant is not represented by
Counsel. The affidavit shall contain the following:
(o) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in
(A) A narration of the relevant facts developed at trial;
*& order and entered in the minutes.
(B; A statement of the cnme(s) of which the defendant was
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there
Convicted;
^as unreasonable delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or
(C) A statement setting out the sentence imposed; and
fhe offense was not properly alleged in the information or
(D^ A statement that the defendant has previously applied
l
adictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the
for a certificate of probable cause, setting forth the issues that
proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for
were presented to the court, the court's ruling and the reasons
*ne offense shall not be barred and the court may make such
given in support of the ruling.
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RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 021903447 FS

PATRICK TILT,

Judge Stanton M. Taylor

Defendant.
Defendant, Patrick Tilt, by and through his attorney of record, Ronald J. Yengich, hereby
moves this Court to suppress any and all statements made by Defendant.
Defendant alleges that said statements violate his right against self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendmentto theUnited States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of January, 2003.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attornrfjf^fcr Defendant

RONALD J. YENOltH
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ADDENDUM VI

L. DEAN SAUNDERS, UBN 6324
Weber County Attorney's Office
2380 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 801-399-8377
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Jo&

FINDINGS OF FACTS,
CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND
ORDER OF THE COURT

vs.

CASE NO. 021903447

PATRICK TILT

JUDGE SCOTT HADLEY
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on August 4,2003, where the Court heard argument
regarding the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Based upon the facts, law governing this case,
and argument from the State and the Defendant, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact,
Conclusion of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 30,2002, Defendant Patrick Tilt voluntarily went to the police station without
previously making an appointment with Detective Gent for the purpose of talking about
the death of his son, Andrew.

2.

At the police station, Defendant voluntarily consented to give a statement to Detective
Gent. Defendant's presence at the station was voluntary and he was free to leave at any
time, up until he confessed, after he was given his Miranda Warnings.

3.

Defendant gave an oral statement, which was contemporaneously recorded. It was

essentially a verbatim recording by Detective Gent by typing the defendant's responses on
his computer.
The statement was contemporaneous and essentially verbatim, as the detective would stop
the defendant if he spoke too fast, and the defendant at times corrected the detective. At
one point in the interview when defendant began to ask Detective Gent questions,
Detective Gent stopped the typed statement and had a conversation with defendant. This
conversation that was documented in Gent's narrative report, was not recorded verbatim.
At the conclusion of each page of the statement, the defendant reviewed and, if necessary,
made corrections to each page of his statement. The defendant then initialed each page as
being accurate.
Part way through the statement the detective thought the defendant began to contradict his
previous statements. Detective Gent therefore gave Defendant his Miranda rights, which
Defendant understood and voluntarily waived.
After Defendant waived his Miranda rights, the defendant gave a second version of his
first statement. The detective continued to type the confession word-for-word, allowing
the defendant to initial his approval at the conclusion of each page.
As the statement progressed, Detective Gent sensed he was building trust with the
defendant, and the defendant would soon confess to killing his son. Detective Gent feared
that interrupting the statement to set up electronic recording equipment would disrupt the
flow of the statement and undermine the trust he had established with the defendant.
Therefore, Detective Gent decided not to utilize electronic recording equipment.
Even though electronic equipment was not used, the statement had perhaps more

2

safeguards than a recording, in that defendant had the ability to change the statement after
he had made it. The defendant was given the opportunity to review each page of the
statement and correct or recant any part which was not true.
10.

After the statement the defendant was allowed to call his family. Upon their arrival, he
was denied the opportunity to see them, but was later granted that right.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based on the foregoing facts, this Court concludes the following:
1.

The statements made by the defendant before he was Mirandized were
contemporaneously recorded essentially word-for-word by Detective Gent. The
defendant's statements were made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, and are valid,
trustworthy confessions.

2.

The statements made by Defendant after Miranda were also contemporaneously recorded
word-for-word by Detective Gent. The detective's Miranda warning to the defendant was
given clearly and intelligently; defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights,
and the defendant's statements are valid, trustworthy confessions.

233

ORDER OF THE COURT
Based upon the stated findings of fact and conclusions of law the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress is denied.
Dated this $~

day of A%rat, 2003

Scott M. Hadley
District Court Judge
Prepared by:

Cjfl/l.

L. Dean Saunders
Deputy County Attorney
proved as to form by:

Ronald J. Ymgich
Counsel for Defendant
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